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Just Around the Riverbed: Reconciling
Navigability Rules in North Carolina
ABSTRACT

Entrenchedin the common law, North Carolina'spublic trust doctrine
applies to waterways and their underlying riverbeds-protectingthem from
misuse and adverse possession-so long as the waterways are navigable in
fact. In North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit veered away from the North
Carolina common law rules governing navigability and instead applied the
more stringentfederal test. The differences between the current North
Carolinacommon law andfederalnavigability testsfor waterways illustrate
the state's sovereign interests, and why the Fourth Circuiterred in applying
the federal regime. This Comment explores the present and future
ramifications of the Alcoa decision on public trust jurisprudencein North
Carolinaandother originalstates.
Public trust doctrine cases implicate unique choice of law
considerations. By disregardingcommon law precedent dating back to the
American Revolution, the Fourth Circuit's decision disrupts the delicate
balance of federalism between state and federal courts. The present
consequences of the FourthCircuit'sdecision includepublic policy concerns
and clouded land titles in North Carolina. The future ramifications include
an expansion offederal question jurisdiction and an upheaval of common
law navigabilityrules in the originalthirteen states.
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INTRODUCTION

The public trust doctrine is an inherent common law concept that
requires the government to protect public lands and resources for its citizens'
use and enjoyment.' Under the doctrine, the government acts as a trusteeholding public lands and resources in trust, subject to certain rules and
limitations. 2 Because the government does not own public trust lands in fee
simple, it may only use and license natural resources to benefit the public
interest.3 Private and public uses of public waters and other natural resources
may not impair the rights of future generations. 4
North Carolina applies the public trust doctrine to all navigable
waterways and their beds thereunder-allowing rivers and riverbeds to be
1. Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law's DNA, 4 WAKE
J. L. & POL'Y 281, 288 (2014) ("The public trust doctrine is one of these inherent
rights that pre-dates the United States Constitution.").
2. Id. at 286-87.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 287-88. The doctrine "embodies this idea that every generation has a
usufructuary right in the resources of the Earth, and those interests are protected by the
inherently limited ownership allowed in natural resources." Id. at 288.
FOREST
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held in a public trust for the use and enjoyment of citizens of the state. 5 As
one of the thirteen original states, North Carolina has recognized public trust
interests in its waterways since before the American Revolution.6
Accordingly, North Carolina courts apply their own common law rules to
7
determine whether a waterway is navigable for title purposes. Over the last
two hundred years, our state courts have defined and expanded the doctrine
as a judicial tool aimed at correcting government mistakes that jeopardize
public trust interests. 8
North Carolina's unique public trust doctrine continues to define the
scope of private and public real property interests across the state. Under the
current statutory scheme, if a trial court finds the waterway is navigable, then
the waterway is subject to the public trust doctrine and protected from
adverse possession.9 If a trial court finds the waterway is not navigable, then
North Carolina's Marketable Title Act applies, and private actors can gain
marketable title to the waterway and its underlying riverbed, via adverse
North Carolina's test for determining navigability is
possession. 10
exceptionally broad, allowing for expansive public use rights and limited
private ownership. I1
In North Carolinav. Alcoa Power Generating,Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disregarded North Carolina's specific
common law rules for navigability.12 In this state-level quiet title action
5. Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 210 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
6. Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 21, 21, 2 Dev. 30, 30 (1828); see North Carolina ex rel.
N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc. (AlcoaPower), 853 F.3d 140, 157 (4th
Cir. 2017) (King, J.,dissenting) (citing N.C. CONST. OF 1776, Decl. of Rights § 25), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018).
7. See generally Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. 189, 190, 1 Jones 183, 185 (1858) (mirroring
England in applying common law tests to determine ownership of land under waterways).
Navigability for title purposes generally means "if a body of water in its natural condition can
be navigable by watercraft," then it is subject to the public trust doctrine. Gwathmey v. State
ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 682 (N.C. 1995). If a waterway
natural condition, then the
is found to be unnavigab[le], i.e., it cannot support watercraft in its
waterway and its riverbed are generally privately owned. See id at 679.
8. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 1, at 286-95; see Brief for American Whitewater et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17-18, Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2017)
(No. 17-683).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2017); see Fish House, Inc., 693 S.E.2d at 211.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-45.1, 47B-2.
11. 2 WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 16.03 (Patrick K. Hetrick &
James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]; see Town of Nags
Head v. Richardson, 817 S.E.2d 874, 882-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (discussing public rights
attaching to public lands in North Carolina).
12. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 151-52; Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 1-2, Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140 (No. 17-683) ("U.S. Court of
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regarding the Yadkin River's riverbed, the court applied the more stringent
federal test for navigability. 3 While the general steps of analysis remain the
same, the federal test is significantly more narrow than North Carolina's
rules and accordingly limits public trust rights. 4 The court concluded that
Alcoa gained title to the Yadkin riverbed because the federal test for
navigability determined the Yadkin River was not navigable. 15
As a result of the Alcoa decision, a private corporation now owns a
portion of the riverbed under North Carolina's Yadkin River.' 6 This
corporation no longer operates any facilities in the state, but continues to
charge North Carolinians $40 million annually for hydroelectric power from
its four dams. 7
The potential ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's ruling violate
principles of federalism and public policy rationales inherit in the public trust
doctrine. In its petition for certiorari, the State of North Carolina suggested
"the Fourth Circuit altered sovereign property rights held by North Carolina
(and other original [s]tates) since before the United States was even
formed."' 8 The court thus "greatly expanded federal court jurisdiction in an
area long thought to be reserved to the original states and their courts."19
This Comment explores present and future ramifications of the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of North Carolina's public trust doctrine. Part I
presents an overview of the procedural posture of this litigation, including
an explanation of the Fourth Circuit's application of the federal navigability
test in North Carolinav. Alcoa Power Generating,Inc. Part II explains how
the Fourth Circuit erred in its decision and disregarded precedent by: (1)
outlining the history of North Carolina's development of its public trust
doctrine, and describing the state's current navigability test; (2) contrasting
North Carolina's navigability rules with the federal test; and (3) by
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit veered from established precedent and crafted new federal
constitutional law that undermines state sovereignty over their submerged lands. The decision
sweeps aside centuries of state law .... ").
13. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 151-52.
14. See generally Rachael Lipinski, The Dividing Line: Applying the Navigability-forTitle Test After PPL Montana, 91 OR. L. REv. 247, 263-71 (2012) (discussing the federal
navigability test).
15. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 151-52.
16. Ken Otterbourg, Alcoa and the Great North CarolinaPower Grab, FORTUNE (Nov.
30, 2010), https://perma.cc/QCW8-WP9C; Ritchie Starnes, U.S. Supreme Court Refuses to
Hear State's Appeal on Alcoa, SALISBURY POST (Feb. 21, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/ZT28-PC64.
17. Otterbourg, supra note 16. Alcoa sold its four dams to Cube Hydro Carolinas in
February 2017. History, CUBE HYDRO CAROLINAS, https://perma.cc/NXJ4-S4DG.
18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140 (No. 17-683).
19. Brief for Law Professors, supra note 12, at 5.
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considering underlying choice of law rationales inherent in the public trust
doctrine and sovereign property rights. Finally, Part III discusses the lessons
learned from this unique case, and provides cautionary advice for states
2°
asserting their public trust rights as well as courts litigating those disputes.
I. NORTH CAROLINA V. ALCOA POWER GENERATING, INC.: A QUIET TITLE
ACTION IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

A.

Factualand ProceduralBackground

Flowing through northwestern North Carolina, the Yadkin River is one
of the state's longest rivers and is also part of the second largest river basin
in the state.2 ' Beginning in 1839, the North Carolina General Assembly
22
authorized the construction of hydroelectric dams along the Yadkin River.
Legislative acts incorporated Alcoa's predecessors in title in the early 1900s
to 1950s, allowing power companies to acquire deeds to the land surrounding
the river and construct three dams. 23 After the enactment of the Federal
Power Act, Alcoa filed for a license from the Federal Power Commission in
1956 to build a fourth dam.24 The Federal Power Commission then issued a
fifty-year license to Alcoa to operate four dams in 1958.25 When its fiftyyear license was about to expire, Alcoa filed a license renewal application
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 2006.26 The27state
time.
government did not object to Alcoa's claim of ownership at that

20. In the interest of brevity, this Comment does not address the merits regarding Alcoa's
chain of title to the riverbed of the disputed portion of the Yadkin River. This Comment
merely argues that should this issue come before a federal court again in one of the thirteen
original states, the case should be remanded to state court or that particular state's common
law test should apply.
21. A Story Map.' Yadkin-Pee Dee River Basin, N.C. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://perma.cc/4BJQ-BZMP (last visited May 5, 2019); About the River, YADKIN
RJvERKEEPER, https://perma.cc/SH2G-BL77 (last visited May 5, 2019).
22. North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 3d 385, 388 (E.D.N.C. 2015). For ease of the reader, the parties will be referred to as
"the State" and "Alcoa" respectively.
23. Id. at 388-89.
24. Alcoa had earlier filed an application in 1937, so the 1958 application was actually
the second application. Alcoa told the Federal Power Commission it owned title to around
sixty percent of the land and water rights to the later disputed thirty-eight-mile segment in
order to obtain the 1958 license. Id. at 389.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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On August 2, 2013, the State of North Carolina, by and through the
North Carolina Department of Administration, filed a civil suit against Alcoa
Power Generating, Inc. in Wake County Superior Court. 28 The State sought
a declaratory judgment to settle its title in trust to the riverbed under a thirtyeight mile stretch of the Yadkin River in Rowan, Davie, Davidson, Stanly,
and Montgomery counties.2 9
In its complaint, the State admitted that Alcoa's 2006 application for
federal license renewal put it on notice that Alcoa claimed ownership of the
riverbed under the Yadkin River. 30 However, the State argued it never
granted, conveyed, or relinquished its ownership interest in the Yadkin
River's riverbed to Alcoa.3 1 Instead, it "conditionally permitted" Alcoa to
construct four dams along the river in order to promote economic
development.32 The State contended Alcoa's continued operation of its
aluminum smelter, which had been in operation at the time the dams were
built, was an integral part of a mutual agreement between the State and

28. Complaint, North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating,
Inc. (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. 2013) (No. 13-CVS-010477); see also Matthew Bums, State Sues
Over Ownershipof Yadkin River, WRAL.cOM (Aug. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/VZZ8-8BW5.
29. Complaint, supra note 28, at 1, 8-9. The thirty-eight-mile portion of the Yadkin
River in dispute is hereinafter referred to as the "relevant segment."
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at4.
32. The four hydroelectric dams include: (1) the High Rock Dam; (2) the Narrows
(Badin) Dam; (3) the Falls Dam; and (4) the Tuckertown Dam. Id. at 3.
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Alcoa.33 When Alcoa permanently shut down its aluminum smelter in April
34
2010, the State claimed Alcoa's actions altered the original agreement.
On September 3, 2013, Alcoa filed a notice of removal to federal court
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction-arguing United States Supreme
Court precedent showed a state's riverbed title claim turned on the federal
test for navigability.3 5 The State then motioned to remand and argued its
36
well-pleaded complaint contained no federal question. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the State's
motion.37 After a hearing solely on the issue of navigability in May 2015,

33. Alcoa operated an aluminum smelting plant powered by the Yadkin River in Badin,
North Carolina from 1916 to 2010. North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa
Power Generating, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 385,388 (E.D.N.C. 2015). Regarding the agreement,
the Complaint alleged in pertinent part:
Before the mid-twentieth century, Alcoa was operating a large aluminum smelting
plant in Badin, Stanly County, North Carolina that employed a large number of the
area's residents in high-paying industrial jobs. This plant also spurred the creation
and subsequent maintenance of a substantial amount of economically significant
indirect employment and business development in the area and the region.
Alcoa's Badin aluminum smelting plant was powered and was made
economically viable (and highly profitable) by electricity generated by the waters
of the Yadkin River ....
Upon information and belief, by the late second half of the twentieth century,
if not before that time, the profits earned by the operation of the [d]ams and Alcoa's
Badin aluminum smelting plant had re-paid the investment costs of building the
[d]ams and the smelting plant.
Complaint, supra note 28, at 4. The district court, however, found the "understanding" was
not "memorialized." North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 385, 388 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
34. Complaint, supra note 28, at 5-7. After April 2010, Alcoa continued to profit from
the hydroelectric dams "without providing the people of North Carolina with any
commensurate economic benefit in return." Id. at 5; see also Judi, Momentum Builds to Keep
Yadkin River in Public Hands, YADKrN RIVERKEEPER (Sept. 6, 2013, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/7PXK-ZQNF.
35. Notice of Removal at 1-8, North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin v. Alcoa
Power Generating, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 479 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-00633-BO).
36. Motion to Remand at 1-5, North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa
Power Generating, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 479 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-00633-BO);
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Remand and Alternative Motion for
Abstention at 1-18, North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 479 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-00633-BO).
37. The court concluded, "a declaration of judgment under state law that the State of
North Carolina owns the portions of the Yadkin River bed at issue necessarily turns on
construction of federal law." North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power
Generating, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 479, 481 (E.D.N.C. 2013).
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the court determined the disputed river segment was not navigable, and a few
months later found Alcoa owned the segment of the Yadkin's riverbed.3 8
On April 3, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, and concluded federal common
law properly determined title ownership in this case. 39 The majority opinion
drew a thirty-seven-page dissent. 4' Despite the robust dissent, the court
denied the State's petition for a rehearing en banc by a one vote margin.41
On February 20, 2018, the United States Supreme Court denied the State's
petition for certiorari.42
B.

The Fourth Circuit'sRationale

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly found Alcoa had
clear title to the relevant segment of the Yadkin River.43 Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit concluded the federal navigability test, as outlined in PPL
Montana, LLC v. Montana, was the proper test to determine navigability of
a waterway for title disputes. 44 In PPL Montana, the United States Supreme
Court recited the basic federal test for navigability:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used,^ in their ordinary condition, as highways for

38. On May 6, 2015, at a hearing solely on the issue of navigability, the district court
found the State failed to prove the relevant segment was navigable at statehood. North
Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL 2131089, at *46 (E.D.N.C. 2015). Alcoa then moved for summary judgment, and argued it obtained valid
title to the Yadkin riverbed via North Carolina's Real Property Marketable Record Title Act,
adverse possession, and laches. North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power
Generating, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 3d 385, 390 (E.D.N.C. 2015). On September 28, 2015, the
court granted Alcoa's motion for summary judgment, and found Alcoa owned the segment of
the riverbed via the Marketable Record Title Act and adverse possession. Id. at 396.
39. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 140-55 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981
(2018).
40. Id. at 155-73 (King, J., dissenting).
41. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 3.
42. North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018).
43. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 155.
44. The Fourth Circuit first concluded "the constitutional nature of state ownership of
navigable waters" was a proper basis for federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the equal
footing doctrine. Id. at 147 48. In a footnote, the court explained whether or not North
Carolina's status as one of the original thirteen states demanded a separate rule than PPL
Montana. Id. at 146, n.2. This oversimplification of federal question jurisdiction is discussed
infra Parts II.C, III.A.
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may be conducted in the
commerce, over which trade and travel are or
45
water.
on
travel
and
trade
of
modes
customary
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's finding of fact under
the PPL Montana navigability rule for clear error. 46 Because a key holding
in PPL Montana provides that portages 47 defeat navigability, the court found
expert testimony establishing "at least five named waterfalls, representing
48
vertical drops of five to seven feet" along the river outcome determinative.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the relevant
segment of the Yadkin River was not navigable-turning a blind eye to an
1885 legislative act declaring the entire Yadkin River a navigable public
highway.4 9

II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY APPLYING THE FEDERAL
NAVIGABILITY REGIME
Beginning in the 1710s, North Carolina has created and expanded its
own common law system regulating the public lands it received directly from
the Crown of England."° Since the state assumed all rights of sovereignty in
1776, North Carolina's public trust doctrine developed distinctly from other
states.51 Previous case law in both state and federal courts have applied
North Carolina common law rules on navigability in title disputes over real
property.52 The Fourth Circuit should have applied North Carolina's

45. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012) (quoting Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
46. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 151.
47. "Portage is the act of carrying or otherwise transporting boats or goods overland
between navigable waters, often around a waterborne obstruction that otherwise prevents
navigation." Jared H. Jones, Annotation, PortageNecessity as Affecting Navigability of
Waterway UnderNonenvironmentalFederalLaw, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 375, 382-83 (2005).
48. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 152.
49. Id. at 153; see Act of March 4, 1885, ch. 212, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws 389 (declaring
the Great Pee Dee and Yadkin rivers public highways).
50. Valerie B. Spalding, The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North
Carolina,12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 23, 33-46 (1989); see also Thomas W. Earnhardt, Defining
Navigable Waters and the Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine in North Carolina, 49
N.C. L. REv. 888, 896-907 (1971) (providing an outdated but detailed review of the doctrine
in North Carolina prior to the 1970s).
51. Eamhardt supra note 50, at 892; Logan Starr, Note, The High Court Wades into
State-Law Water Allocation, 62 DUKE L.J. 1425, 1437-38 (2013); see N.C. CONST. OF 1776,
Decl. of Rights § 25.
52. Swan Island Club, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 209 F.2d 698, 699-700 (4th Cir. 1954);
Gwathmey v. State ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 679
(N.C. 1995).
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common law definition of navigability in North Carolinav. Alcoa Power
53
Generating,Inc.
A.

North Carolina'sPublic Trust Doctrine
1. Common Law Overview

The public trust doctrine stems from English common law, brought over
when colonists arrived from England."
North Carolina's early
parliamentary statutes adopted English common law in 1711 and 1715, and
its early courts first used an "ebb-and-flow" test to determine which
waterways were subject to the public trust doctrine. 5 When North Carolina
declared independence from England in 1776, the State acquired title to "all
the territories, seas, waters and harbors, with their appurtenances" within its
borders. 6 However, the English public trust doctrine did not account for the
interior rivers and other non-tidal waters unique to North Carolina. 7 After
consideration of the unique topography of the state, the North Carolina
Supreme Court created a new navigability test in 1828.58 In Wilson v.
Forbes, the court held a waterway was navigable if it was "wide and deep
enough for sea vessels to navigate.., without any obstruction."59 The court
declared the lunar tides test "obsolete" and no longer part of the state's
common law. 60
Early case law interpreting North Carolina's new navigability testmodernly called the "navigable in fact" test---created the following rule of
construction: when a waterway is found to be navigable, the court must
presume the General Assembly did not intend to convey lands in a manner
that would impair public trust rights. 61 This presumption is overcome only
53. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 140-55.
54. Earnhardt, supra note 50, at 892. For a more detailed analysis of English common
law and its modification in the states, see Spalding, supra note 50, at 29-38.
55. Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 21, 21, 2 Dev. 30, 30 (1828); William E. Nelson,
Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal History of Colonial North
Carolina,1660-1775, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2133, 2137-39 (2010); Spalding, supra note 50, at 46;
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2017) (formally adopting common law reception after
independence in 1778).
56. N.C. CONST. OF 1776, Decl. of Rights § 25; see Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 158 (King,
J., dissenting); Spalding, supra note 50, at 46.
57. Spalding, supra note 50, at 47.
58. Wilson, 13 N.C. at 21, 2 Dev. at 30; Spalding, supra note 50, at 47.
59. Wilson, 13 N.C. at 24, 2 Dev. at 35.
60. Id.at 24-25, 2 Dev. at 35; see Gwathmey v. State ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health,
& Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 679 -80 (N.C. 1995) (internal citation omitted).
61. Wilson, 13 N.C. at 21, 2 Dev. at. 30; 2 WEBSTER'S, supra note 11, at § 16.04 ("The
North Carolina Supreme Court has approved.., the test for navigability is whether the body
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by a special legislative grant expressly conveying the underlaying lands in
fee to a private party, without reserving any public trust rights.62 Still today,
the legislature may only grant public trust land to a private party where a
"sufficient public purpose exists."63
Several statutes and a state constitutional amendment impose additional
duties on North Carolina as trustee under the public trust doctrine. In 1971,
the North Carolina General Assembly passed a law declaring "the
preservation of certain rivers or segments of rivers in their natural and scenic
The next year, the
condition constitutes a beneficial public purpose.'
people of North Carolina voted to commemorate the public policy behind
the public trust doctrine in a state constitutional amendment, which reads in
pertinent part: "It shall be the policy of this [s]tate to conserve and protect its
lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry .... "65 Then, in 1985, the
legislature passed a law protecting public trust lands from adverse possession
by private parties.6 6 North Carolina General Statute section 1-45.1 reads as
follows:
Title to real property held by the State and subject to public trust rights may
not be acquired by adverse possession. As used in this section, "public trust
rights" means those rights held in trust by the State for the use and benefit of
the people of the State in common. They are established by common law as
interpreted by the courts of this State. They include, but are not limited to,
the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in

of water in question is navigable in fact.") (footnote omitted); see also State ex rel. Rohrer v.
Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 828 (N.C. 1988) (noting legislative exception).
62. Wilson, 13 N.C. at 21, 2 Dev. at 30; Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. 189, 190-91, 1 Jones
183, 185-186 (1858); Spalding, supra note 50, at 49.
63. Spalding, supra note 50, at 49; see Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187,
194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) ("[T]he General Assembly may convey ownership of public trust
land to a private party, but will be considered to have retained public trust rights in that land
unless specifically relinquished in the transferring legislation by the clearest and most express
terms." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-31 (1973) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B135.142 (2017)) ("The General Assembly finds that certain rivers of North Carolina possess
outstanding natural, scenic, educational, geological, recreational, historic, fish and wildlife,
It is further
scientific and cultural values of great present and future benefit to the people ....
declared that the preservation of certain rivers or segments of rivers in their natural and scenic
condition constitutes a beneficial public purpose.").
65. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 (1972); see also State ex rel. Rohrer, 369 S.E.2d at 831
("Our state constitution mandates the conservation and protection of public lands and waters
for the benefit of the public.").
66. Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 277, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 227 (declaring the existing
policy of the state that title to land subject to public trust rights may not be acquired by adverse
possession). This session law is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2017).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2019

11

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:503

the watercourses of the State and the right to freely use and enjoy
the State's
67

ocean and estuarine beaches and public access to the beaches.
North Carolina courts continue to protect the state's natural resources
by limiting privatization.6 8
2. North Carolina'sCurrentNavigability Test
The modem North Carolina Supreme Court case explaining the current
navigability rules under the state's public trust doctrine is Gwathmey v.
State.6 9 Gwathmey involved a title dispute, between private landowners and
the State, to land under marshlands and an adjoining creek." The trial court
found the adjoining creek was navigable in fact and thus navigable as a
matter of law.7 1
Before addressing the merits, the court recognized the public trust
doctrine as a judicial tool used to protect inherent public rights in stateowned submerged land. : The court then stated the current navigability test
under North Carolina's public trust doctrine:
[I]f a body of water in its natural condition can be navigated by watercraft,
it is navigable in fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if it has not been
used for such purpose. Lands lying beneath such waters that are navigable
73
in law are the subject of the public trust doctrine.
Applying this test, the court remanded the case to determine
navigability of the creek by its "capacity to support watercraft used for
pleasure or commercial purposes, not by whether they ever have actually
been used for purposes of navigation. ' 74 The court explained that "although
evidence of present or past actual navigation of the waters in question is
evidence tending to support a finding that the waters are navigable in fact,

67. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

1-45.1 (2017).

68. See Town of Nags Head v. Richardson, 817 S.E.2d 874, 882-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018)
(discussing local town's standing in a public trust dispute); Melissa K. Scanlan, The Role of
the Courts in GuardingAgainst PrivatizationofImportantPublic EnvironmentalResources,
7 MICH. J. ENVTL. &ADMIN. L. 237, 264 (2018).
69. Gwathmey v. State ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674,
676-88 (N.C. 1995).
70. Id. at 676-77.
71. Id. at 677.
72. Id. (quoting Monica Kivel Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle to Preserve North
Carolina'sEstuarineMarshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to EstuarineMarshes,
Denialof Permits to Fill,and the Public Trust, 64 N.C. L. REv. 565, 572 (1986)).
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
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such evidence will not be needed in every case in order to establish
navigability in fact."75
In 2010, the North Carolina Court of Appeals extended the public trust
doctrine to land under manmade canals.76 In Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, the
court held that North Carolina's controlling law of navigability "reflects only
upon the manner in which the water flows without diminution or
obstruction."7 7 Thus, both manmade and artificial water flows which are
"capable of navigation by watercraft" are subject to the public trust doctrine
in North Carolina.78
B.

Comparingand ContrastingNorth Carolina'sCommon Law and
FederalNavigabilityRules

At first glance, the North Carolina and federal navigability tests appear
to be the same. 79 Both assert all waterways that are navigable in fact are
navigable in law.8" Additionally, artificial waterways can be subject to the
public trust doctrine under both regimes. 8 1 Although the language is similar,
case law reveals that North Carolina's common law test does more to protect
public trust rights than the federal rule because of its expansive definition of
navigable waterways.8 2 North Carolina's broad navigability analysis is best
illustrated through specific distinctions from, and comparisons to, the federal
test.
First, the boats used to test navigability of a waterway differ in type and
purpose. North Carolina's approach focuses on a waterway's capacity for
non-commercial use boats, such as "pleasure boating," to test whether water
is navigable.83 The North Carolina navigability test is sometimes referred to
75. Id.
76. Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 164 (4th Cir. 2017) (King, J., dissenting) ("On its face,
North Carolina's navigability test is somewhat similar to the federal navigability test, in that
both tests weigh the question of whether waters have been or can be used by watercraft."),
cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 981 (2018).
80. Id.at 163 (majority opinion) (quoting Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)
for the federal standard); id. at 164 (quoting Gwathmey v. State ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Env't,
Health, & Nat. Res., 464 S.E.2d 674, 682 (N.C. 1995) for the North Carolina standard).
81. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012) (noting case law
recognizing that an artificial canal is navigable); FishHouse, Inc., 693 S.E.2d at 135 ("[O]ur
test for navigability does not discriminate between natural and artificial waterways.").
82. Scholars have noted that the definition of navigable waterways in North Carolina
after Gwathmey is so broad that it "seems problematical." 2 WEBSTER'S, supra note 11, at §
16.04; see Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 674.
83. Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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as the "pleasure craft test."'8 4 "Pleasure boating" may be for recreation or
profit.85 The North Carolina Supreme Court has concluded the following
boats can be used to test a waterway's navigability: "boats drawing 5 or 6
feet of water,"'8 6 barges, 87 flat boats,8 8 and skiffs.89 Arguably, canoes,
kayaks, and other small recreational boats can also determine navigability. '
In contrast, the federal test focuses on the commercial purposes for
navigation, depending on whether "the stream or body of water is capable in
its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what
mode the commerce may be conducted."'"
Recreational use is not
determinative under the federal definition.92 Instead, the federal test focuses
on a boat's extensive and continuous use for the purpose of commerce.9 3
Boats used for commercial purposes typically include larger boats and
ships.94 Because the federal test does not allow small, lightweight boats to
determine navigability, it is easier to find a river navigable under North

Carolina common law.
Another distinction between the tests involves segmentation. Under
North Carolina common law, a river may be assessed for navigability on the

84. See Letter to Richard B. Whisnant, in 1998 N.C. AT'Y GEN. REPS. & OPINIONs 346.
85. Fish House, Inc., 693 S.E.2d at 211-12.
86. State v. Twiford, 48 S.E. 586, 586 (N.C. 1904).
87. Id. at 587.
88. State v. Duplin Canal Co., 91 N.C. 637, 638 (1884) (deciding a case in the context of
a conviction for obstructing a navigable stream). Cf State v. Glen, 7 N.C. (1 Jones) 321, 333
(1859) ("All the rivers, creeks and other watercourses, not embraced in the above description,
but which are, in fact, sufficiently wide and deep to be navigable by boats, flats and rafts, are
technically styled unnavigable, and are open to be appropriated by individuals, by grants from
the State, under the entry laws.").
89. Gaither v. Albemarle Hospital, 70 S.E.2d 680, 685 (N.C. 1952).
90. Letter to Richard B. Whisnant, supra note 84; see Bauman v. Woodlake Partners,
LLC, 681 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that a kayak trip on a creek made
points of the creek navigable, but that the stream was not navigable in fact because the kayak
trip only covered a short distance instead of the entire stream).
91. 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 139 (2013) [hereinafter Waters] (citing United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931)).
92. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 600-01 (2012) ("Evidence of
recreational use, depending on its nature, may bear upon susceptibility of commercial use at
the time of statehood.") (emphasis added).
93. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931).
94. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 8 (2007).
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whole, if not limited on the face of a complaint.95 In effect, North Carolina
courts balance minor interruptions with the overall length of the river.9 6 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly disavowed a navigability test
using segmentation in Bauman v. Woodlake Partners,LLC.97 In Bauman,
the court stated segmenting a stream to determine navigability of its
individual parts "would introduce considerable confusion and difficulty into
98
the application of the public trust doctrine in North Carolina." The court
concluded by stating, "We do not believe that such a result is mandated by
or consistent with applicable North Carolina law and decline to adopt such
an approach."99 The federal test, on the other hand, focuses on segmentation
and mandates that courts consider a river's navigability on a segment-bysegment basis. " Thus, the federal approach does not compare the length of
unnavigable segments to the overall length of an otherwise navigable
river.1" 1 It limits public trust rights down to an exact point-a hodgepodge
of navigable and unnavigable parts. 102
A third key distinction between the two tests is whether portages, or
traveling by land around an obstacle, defeat a river's navigability. Under
North Carolina's regime, a waterfall or portage generally does not defeat
navigability.1 °3 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in PPL
Montana concluded that a need for portage to avoid waterfalls or rapids
defeats navigability." 4 The different approaches to the types of boats to
measure navigability, segmentation rules, and portages were heavy-handed
in the Alcoa litigation; and these three differences were outcome
determinative at the trial court's hearing on navigability.' 05

95. Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 213 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding
that the "issue of navigability of the entire canal was properly before the trial court" because
the plaintiff did not specify which portion was at issue).
96. Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N.C. 675, 681 (1886).
97. Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 681 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 598-600 (2012).
101. Id. at 600-01 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 90 (1931)).
102. Id. at 593-94.
103. Broadnax v. Baker, 94 N.C. 675, 681 (1886).
104. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 597-598; see Jones, supra note 47.
105. North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL
2131089, at *1-6 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
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The Fourth CircuitShould Have Applied North Carolina's
NavigabilityRegime

If the Fourth Circuit had applied the North Carolina common law test
for navigability, the people of North Carolina would still own the Yadkin
River's riverbed. The Fourth Circuit relied on the portages along the relevant
segment of the river to defeat navigability, determining they were
treacherous and seemingly impassible at the time of statehood.' 06 Under the
North Carolina test, such portages would not defeat the navigability of the
Yadkin River on the whole. 7 Additionally, if North Carolina's recreational
use test determined the Yadkin's navigability, then the State likely could
have proven that the relevant segment was navigable by canoes or kayaks.108
Instead, larger and more cumbersome "pole boats" were used to measure
navigability under the federal standard."09
As a matter of public policy, the presumption under both North Carolina
and federal law against conveyances in fee of submerged public trust lands
should prevail.110 By requiring express disownment of public trust rights in
legislative grants, North Carolina seeks to protect the people from bungled
government actions or inactions by requiring courts to look at state grants
with skepticism."' Even if the State's argument that its agreement with
Alcoa was revocable is not persuasive, in 1885 the North Carolina General
106. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 152 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018).
The State conceded that two waterfalls, each plunging roughly seven feet, were not
susceptible to navigation for commerce. North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., No.
5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL 2131089, at *5 (E.D.N.C. 2015). The trial court concluded that
this stipulation denied navigability for the entire relevant segment. Id.
107. Broadnax, 94 N.C.at 681.
108. The Yadkin Riverkeeper gives regular tours of the river, including a trip down the
184.5 miles to the South Carolina border, in recreational kayaks. Judi, That was One for the
Books! Tour de Yadkin Finale, YADKIN RIVERKEEPER (July 11, 2013, 3:03 PM),
https://perma.cc/67S7-6M48; Judi, Yadkin Riverkeeper Announces Plan to Paddle River,
YADKIN RIVERKEEPER (Mar. 21, 2010, 2:41 PM), https://perma.cc/VXT2-PYDA.
109. North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL
2131089, at *3 (E.D.N.C. 2015). An expert for Alcoa described pole boats as ranging "from
30 to 70 feet long while only six to seven feet wide and could carry up to 20,000 pounds of
cargo[,] ... unable to make the turns needed to navigate around large obstacles" and
particularly susceptible to capsizing. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 152.
110. Spalding, supranote 50, at 43, 49; see supra footnotes 61-63 and accompanying text.
111. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 1, at 310 ("When government actions (and inactions)
allow private interests to substantially impair trust resources, beneficiaries of the public trust
can rely on the courts to hold the government accountable and ensure that it acts in a manner
consistent with the public interest."); see Joseph L. Sax, The PublicTrust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 508 (1970) (arguing
legislative grants may be read "in conformity with the high sense of duty which the state has
toward the administration of its trust lands").
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Assembly declared the "Great Pee Dee and Yadkin rivers public
highways."1 12 This declaration impliedly requires that the North Carolina
common law rules govern because the legislature took affirmative steps
toward asserting public trust rights in the Yadkin River. Additionally,
Choice of law rules and concerns of clouding land titles further illustrate that
the Fourth Circuit should have used North Carolina's definition of
navigability in North Carolinav. Alcoa Power Generating,Inc.
1. North CarolinaQuiet Title Actions are a State Law Issue
The main differences between North Carolina and the federal
definitions of navigability stem from the idea that North Carolina gained title
to its riverbeds straight from the British Crown.' 13 By creating its own
common law before the existence of the Union, North Carolina courts have
held that navigability of a waterway wholly within North Carolina does not
create an issue arising under the Constitution of the United States. 114 This
choice of law logic was disputed throughout the Alcoa litigation and
ultimately rejected by the Fourth Circuit.115
Alcoa removed the case to federal court claiming the issue of
navigability presented a federal question.116 However, federal question
jurisdiction is generally limited in quiet title actions-and absent an,
interstate commerce issue, title to land under navigable waters is governed
by state law.117 Further, declaratory judgments regarding title to real
112. Act of March 4, 1885, ch. 212, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws 389 (declaring the Great Pee
Dee and Yadkin rivers public highways); see Complaint, supra note 28, at 6-8.
113. See Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 157 (J. King, dissenting) (citing N.C. CONST. OF 1776,
Decl. of Rights § 25); Earnhardt, supra note 50, at 892.
114. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 18-22 (arguing that the court
was required to apply state law to decide navigability). This issue is discussed further infra
Part HI.
115. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 146-50.
116. Notice of Removal, supra note 35; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (2012). No diversity
jurisdiction existed at the time of removal between the parties because Alcoa had substantial
contacts in North Carolina. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317 (1945).
117. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) ("The State's power over the
beds of navigable waters remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power of the
United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign commerce.");
see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 390-95 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 7th ed. 2016)
(discussing the extremely limited circumstances where federal common law may be utilized
by federal courts). Outside of title disputes, navigability is used to determine the federal
government's authority under the Admiralty and Commerce Clauses. For a history of
navigability under the federal regulatory power, see Richard C. Ausness, The Supreme Court
and the PPL Montana Case: Examining the Relationship Between Navigability and State
Ownership of Submerged Lands, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 168, 185-99 (2013).
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property are inherently state court issues under lex loci rei sitae, or the situs
rule."' 8 The situs rule, articulated by Justice Story in 1846, provides that the
law of the place where the real property is located controls. 119 Under lex
situs, courts apply a state's common law "to determine issues in which the
situs has the dominant interest."' 120 Generally, federal courts should abstain
12
from hearing state law issues involving a state's sovereign interests. 1
Moreover, because North Carolina, as a trustee, has a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens' public trust rights, the Fourth Circuit should have
applied North Carolina common law to determine ownership of the Yadkin
22
River's riverbed. 1
2. Changingthe North CarolinaRule Will Likely CloudLand Titles
North Carolina's public trust rights are embedded in its laws and court
precedent. One need look no further than the North Carolina Constitution of
1776.123 The Declaration of Rights expressly declares "all the territories,
seas, waters and harbors... agreeable to the said charter of King Charles,
are the right and property of the people of this [s]tate, to be held by them in
sovereignty[.]"' 124 North Carolina real property owners have relied on such
25
provisions since the state's founding. 1
Providing static title record systems for "a bona fide purchaser who has
relied upon record title" is a key rationale behind the situs rule. 126 Departing

118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see
Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1924) (explaining the general rule "that
the tenure, transfer, control and disposition of real property are matters which rest exclusively
with the state where the property lies"); 2 WEBSTER'S, supranote 11.
119. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8.1 (6th ed.
2010).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
121. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 22-27 (citing Gunn v. Minton, 568
U.S. 251 (2013) in its discussion of the limits on federal question jurisdiction); LARRY W.
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 513-15 (Carolina Acad. Press ed., 3d ed. 2009).
122. See Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney
Generalas the Guardianof the State's NaturalResources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57,
76-77 (2005); Spalding, supra note 50, at 47.
123. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights § 25.
124. Id.
125. Brief for American Whitewater et al., supra note 8, at 17-18; see State ex rel. Rohrer
v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 831 (N.C. 1988) ("[F]rom our examination of the background of
the case before us ... [b]ecause of our recognition of the public trust doctrine, no title in fee
can be granted to lands submerged beneath navigable waters."); Waters, supra note 91, at
§ 137 ("[W]hat shall be deemed a navigable water within the meaning of the local rules of
property in the bed of a stream is a matter of state law." (internal citation omitted)).
126. WEINTRAUB, supra note 119, at § 8.2.
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from the rules of the situs disrupts longstanding public trust interests and
creates notice issues.127 Such a drastic change from common law precedent
could strip innocent landowners of their rights in waterway cases. 128 Judge
King's dissent in Alcoa echoed these trepidations and stated, "I am also
concerned that the majority's ruling will result in a sea change with respect
to judicial decisions that have already recognized North Carolina's
ownership of its waters and the lands thereunder.... [T]he majority's ruling
to land under
could cloud land titles in North Carolina."' 129 Questioning titles
30
litigation.'
of
floodgates
the
open
could
valuable waterways
III. FUTURE RIVERBED LITIGATION: LESSONS LEARNED
Though the public trust rights of the original thirteen states are
seemingly niche issues, they are vastly important.' 3 ' If another riverbed title
dispute comes before a federal court in one of the original thirteen states, the
court will have to decide which navigability test to apply.'3 2 Because the
Fourth Circuit's choice of law "create[d] widespread discord between federal
and state courts on a legal issue with important implications for federalism
and property rights[J" a potential circuit split is on the horizon in the First,
Second, Third, or Eleventh Circuits. 3 3 In the event such a case comes before
these federal courts, the common law of the original state in which the
waterway is located should apply for two main reasons. First, because PPL
Montana'sholding did not extend to original states. And second, the original
thirteen states' public trust rights do not present a federal question. Attorney
generals of original states should proceed with caution in future submerged
land title disputes to ensure protection of waterways for future generations.

127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
128. Brief for American Whitewater et al., supranote 8, at 17-18.
129. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 162 (4th Cir. 2017) (King, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
138 S.Ct. 981 (2018).
130. Brief for American Whitewater et al., supra note 8, at 20; see Gerrit Jbbsis, Big Dam
Successes in the Southeast, AM. RIVERS (Aug. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/R2VU-8EX3
(discussing other private dam litigation in the southeast).
131. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 13-15.
132. Id. at 24; Sean Morrison, Public Trust or Equal Footing:A HistoricalLook at Public
Use Rights in American Waters, 21 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 69, 108-09
(2015) (predicting problematic choice of law concerns after the PPL Montana decision).
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 18. These four federal circuit courts
encompass the original thirteen states. The original thirteen states are Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina,
New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. US States: Order
and Dates of Statehood,ENCHANTED LEARNING, https://perma.cc/7YU6-WWXT (last visited
May 8, 2019).
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PPL Montana'sLimited Holding

Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, the United States
Supreme Court did not categorically make public trust cases federal issues
in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana.13 4 Federal question jurisdiction was
proper in PPL Montana because Montana is a later admitted state whose
public trust rights are subject to the equal footing doctrine.' 35 The equal
footing doctrine is distinctly a constitutional doctrine, while the public trust
doctrine arises from common law.' 3 6 Though both doctrines dictate title to
public trust lands, they need not be intertwined.137
The equal footing doctrine was created in reaction to the original states
retaining their public trust lands upon their entry into the Union.'
The
Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine in 1845 as a means "to support
the principle that each state inherited title to the submerged lands of
navigable waters upon entering the union."'3 When a new state is created
under Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, the equal
footing doctrine provides that the state "assume[s] sovereignty on an 'equal
footing' with the established States."'' 4 New states' property interests thus
pass under, and subject to, the Constitution as they receive public lands from
the federal government. 141
134. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 148 (J. King, dissenting) ("[W]hen the PPL Montana Court
stated that 'questions of navigability for determining state riverbed title are governed by
federal law,' it was only reaffirming the federal nature of the issue of navigability for title, a
nature evident since the founding and recognized in cases over the course of more than 150
years."). But see PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012) (concluding "the
public trust remains a matter of state law").
135. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 597; Morrison, supranote 132, at 71; see Amy Wegner
Kho, Note, What Lies Beneath Troubled Waters: The Determination ofNavigable Waters in
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012), 15 U. DENy. WATER L. REv. 489,
492-94 (2012).
136. Morrison, supra note 132 (quoting PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 597).
137. Id. at 74-76.
138. Ausness, supra note 117, at 181.
139. Morrison, supra note 132, at 91 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 27 (1894);
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845)). However, "[i]t wasn't until the 1920s
that the federal courts decided that the equal footing doctrine made 'navigable waters' for
purposes of title a federal, as opposed to state law, question." Id. at 75. The exact origin of
the equal footing doctrine is discussed infra Part III.B.
140. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981).
141. Morrison, supra note 132, at 74-76; Frank W. DiCastri, Are All States Really Equal?
The "Equal Footing" Doctrine and Indian Claims to Submerged Land, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
179, 182 (1997); Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal
FootingDoctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 817, 817-18 (1980); see United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 56 (1926) ("Navigability, when assertedas the basis of a right arising
under the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be
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The main distinction between the equal footing and public trust
doctrines is the source, or grantor, of the property rights. Though both
original and later admitted states gained title to public lands at statehood,
only the latter received theirs directly from the federal government.142 The
original thirteen states existed as sovereigns before the federal government,
and received their public trusts rights straight from the British Crown. 143 The
United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in PPL Montana.144
The Court emphasized equal footing doctrine has "constitutional
foundation" while "the public trust remains a matter of state law.' 45 The
Court explicitly noted that the equal footing doctrine turned on federal law
because "a [s]tate's title to [public trust] lands was conferred not by Congress
itself." 146 This holding was impliedly limited to later
but by the Constitution
47
admitted states. 1
B. Public Trust Rights in the OriginalThirteen States Do Not "Arise
Under" the Federal Constitution
For proper federal question jurisdiction, the civil controversy must
148
"arise[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'
Whether navigability for title purposes presents a federal question depends
on whether a state was one of the original thirteen states or a later admitted
state.' 49 All parties in Alcoa agreed that the equal footing doctrine
determines public trust rights for later admitted states, and those rights are a

determined according to the general rule recognized and applied in the federal courts.")
(emphasis added).
142. DiCastri, supra note 141; Touton, supra note 141 (noting that "the national
government was the original owner of substantially all the land that now forms most of the
other states[,]" but not the original thirteen).
143. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842); Ausness, supra
note 117, at 172-74; Morrison, supranote-132, at 74-76.
144. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603-04 (2012); Touton, supra note 141.
145. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 603.
146. Id. at 591 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
147. See Morrison, supra note 132, at 96-97 (discussing PPL Montana's holding and
stating that after the decision, "new states were deprived of the right as sovereign to determine
the most appropriate rule regarding public ownership of submerged lands for their own
geography and culture.").
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). Notably, Alcoa removed the case pursuant to the statutory
authority for federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, supra note 35, at 2. Arguably,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 "arising under" jurisdiction is narrower than Article III jurisdiction.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 292-95.
149. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. For a history of federal court
jurisprudence on navigability for title issues, see Ausness, supra note 117, at 199-213.
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federal question. 150 However, the State argued the original thirteen states
public trust rights do not present a federal question.151 The Fourth Circuit
rejected this argument in part on a policy rationale stating the State's
argument "would result in a bizarre state of affairs with two different classes
of [s]tates under the Constitution."''5 2 Yet distinct rules in different states is
a core tenant of federalism, and other areas of law already recognize unique
53
legal differences between the states. 1
The United States Supreme Court has long held that "the contours of
th[e] public trust [doctrine] do not depend upon the Constitution."' 54 In the
seminal case Martin v. Lessee of Waddell in 1842, the Court held that after
the American Revolution, "the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to
the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general
government."' 5 5 For original states whose public trust rights extend back to
before statehood, the Constitution did not alter title to lands under navigable
56
waters they already possessed. 1
After the American Revolution, seven states owned western lands past
their original boundaries, and six states did not.157 As part of a compromise
150. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981
(2018).
151. Id. at 147. Specifically, the State claimed, "PPL [Montana], an equal footing case,
has no bearing on the riverbed title of an original state. PPL's language that 'questions of
navigability for determining state riverbed title are governed by federal law,'... applies
solely to the 'new' equal footing states[.]" Id at 147.
152. Id. at 149. The Court bypassed the State's argument that its well-pleaded complaint
did not contain a federal question. Id at 146. This decision ignored a core tenant of § 1331
jurisdiction: "[I]f a plaintiff chooses not to present a federal claim, even though one is
potentially available, the defendant may not remove the case from state to federal court."
CHEMERrNSKY, supra note 117, at 304. For a discussion of the unsettled jurisprudence on
federal question jurisdiction involving state causes of action, see id.at 311-18.
153. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 18-22. For example, the legality
of common law marriages varies from state to state. See generally John B. Crawley, Is the
Honeymoon Overfor Common-Law Marriage:A Considerationof the Continued Viability of
the Common-Law MarriageDoctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 399, 401-05 (1999) (discussing the
history of common law marriage and the few states that have the doctrine today).
154. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012); see Morrison, supra note
132, at 75-83, 97-99.
155. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (emphasis added);
see Morrison, supra note 132, at 80.
156. See Craig, supra note 94, at 4; Touton, supra note 141, at 817-18; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 8.
157. C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and
States in Landholdings, 28 TEX. L. REv. 43, 46 (1949).
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for the Articles of Confederation, the larger seven states ceded their western
lands to the Confederation.158 Though the Articles failed, the Northwestern
Ordinance of 1787 promulgated the deal.' 59 These western lands, along with
other territories from which subsequent states might seek admission into the
Union, were subject to the equal footing doctrine.160
Though the equal footing doctrine mandates all subsequently admitted
states are "on an equal footing with the original states in all respects[,]" one
key caveat exists: timing. 16 1 After the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the
United States held land for new states obtained "by grant from the original
162 In
states, purchase, treaty, and conquest" until a new state was formed.
contrast, the original thirteen states' public trust lands were never held by the
United States as an intermediary.163 Though later admitted states are on an
equal footing in theory, practically, only later admitted states that were
"temporarily[] deprived of control" of their public trust lands by the federal
government are subject to the equal footing doctrine.1I4 Public trust doctrine
quiet title actions arising in original states do not present a federal question
because the original thirteen states' public trust rights are not subject to the
equal footing doctrine-public trust rights alone do65not "aris[e] under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'
In future submerged land litigation in an original state, courts should
apply that state's unique definition of navigability. Like North Carolina, the
other original states' public trust doctrines date back to the American
6 6 Each developed
Revolution "as a matter of their conquest of England."'

158. Id.
159. Id. at 63-64; see Morrison, supra note 132, at 91.
160. Patterson, supra note 157, at 64. The main policy goal behind the equal footing
doctrine was to stop the federal government from requiring explicit concessions from new
states seeking admission to the Union. Touton, supra note 141, at 833.
161. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845); see Ausness, supra note 117, at 172-74.
162. Touton, supra note 141, at 817-18; Morrison, supranote 132, at 91-92.
163. Id. At founding, the federal government owned no land at all, and the original thirteen
states exercised sovereignty over their own lands respectively. John C. Ruple, The Transfer
of Public Lands Movement: The Battle to Take "Back" Lands That Were Never Theirs, 29
COLO. NAT. REs., ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (2018); Touton, supranote 141, at 836
("[A]t the time of the formation of the Union the original states retained overflowed land as
sovereigns for common use[.]").
164. Pollard,44 U.S. at 224; see Morrison, supra note 132, at 80-82; Ruple, supra note
163.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); see Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,
396-97 (1842); DiCastri, supra note 141, at 183-84; Patterson, supranote 157.
166. Craig, supranote 94, at 6.
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its own common law doctrine before the creation of the Union, and those
early developments continue to influence separate doctrines today. 167
C.

North Carolinav. Alcoa Power Generating,Inc.: A CautionaryTale

There are over three-hundred and fifty privately owned hydroelectric
dams along the waterways of the original thirteen states. 6 As trustee, each
state has absolute control of the trust property and, in exercising its fiduciary
1 69
duties, has an affirmative obligation to protect public trust lands.
Specifically, each state must carefully consider potential impacts of private
actors' exploitations of the corpus. 1 7 1 Some practical tips derived from Alcoa
will assist in governmental trustees protecting public trust rights for future
generations.
1. States Should Devote SubstantialAttention and Resources to Public
Trust Cases
Generally, states have broad discretion under the public trust doctrine
to determine how to best manage their resources for the public benefit. 7'
This discretion is vested in state attorney generals. 172 Attorney generals may
sue private entities for damages and injunctive relief as trustee of the public
trust. 173 In order to keep title to the riverbeds within the trust corpus, attorney
generals in the original thirteen states must diligently litigate riverbed
cases. 174
After five years of litigation, Alcoa shows the importance of a factintensive inquiry into navigability for title purposes. In its finding of fact
and conclusions of law as to navigability, the district court lamented the lack
of evidence put on by the State at the navigability hearing. 175 The State did
167. Id.; see generally id. at 26-113 (discussing different navigability tests within eastern
states).

168. InteractiveReports, NAT'L INVENTORY

OF DAMS,

https://perma.cc/US6H-YAU3 (last

visited May 9, 2019) (author conducted an "Advanced Search" of the Interactive Reports,
filtering the results by "Owner Type = 'Private,"' "Primary Purpose = 'Hydroelectric,"' and
"State = 'CT;' 'DE;' 'GA;' 'MD;' 'MA;' 'NH;' 'NY;' 'NC; 'PA;' 'RI;' 'SC;' and 'VA"'
respectively).
169. Kanner, supra note 122, at 75-78.
170. See id. at 77- 78.
171. Id. at 75-78.
172. Id. at 59.
173. Id. at 61-62.
174. See id. at 112-15 (discussing attorney generals' incentives to enforce public trust
rights); Sax, supra note 111, at 508-09; Scanlan, supra note 68, at 255.
175. North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL
2131089, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
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not put on any evidence of the relevant segment's geology, and only had one
expert witness to rebut Alcoa's three. 176 Early navigability rulings are
critical, and front-end work securing robust evidence of navigability is
essential for attorney generals. Such evidence might include the condition
of the river at founding, any colonial expeditions, types of boats used at the
time, and points along the river that require portaging.
Timing is also essential in asserting public trust rights. Arguably, the
state may revoke a public trust property license from a private party
whenever they cease to benefit the public.' 77 However, Alcoa shows states
should clear title to public trust lands as soon as practicably possible after
the public benefit stops. In its order granting Alcoa's motion for summary
judgment, the district court emphasized the State's delayed assertion of
public trust rights-seven years after it first learned of Alcoa's ownership
claims.17 8 The court deplored the State's all too convenient inaction, stating,
'
"It is impossible not to notice the timing of this lawsuit."179
2. Beware of Early StipulationsRegardingNavigability
After Alcoa and PPL Montana, a well-pleaded complaint can make or
break a public trust doctrine case. 180 In Alcoa, the State used the term
"relevant segment" in its complaint to describe the part of the river at
issue. " 1 Perhaps unbeknownst to the State, the early use of the terms
"relevant segment" set the stage for removal based on federal question
jurisdiction. 8 ' The federal standard under PPL Montana turns on "relevant
segment" language, and segments are determined on the face of the
' With current
complaint-only those segments are tested for navigability. 83
176. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 152-54 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 981
(2018).
177. Kanner, supra note 122, at 70-72 (discussing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); see Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 ("A grant of all the
lands under the navigable waters of a [s]tate has never been adjudged to be within the
legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void
on its face, as subject to revocation.").
178. North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 3d 385,396 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
179. Id.
180. Federal question jurisdiction is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which
states that "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of
the plaintiffis properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987).
181. Complaint, supra note 28, at 6-12.
182. See North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc.,
989 F. Supp. 2d 479, 481 (E.D.N.C. 2013).
183. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012).
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confusion over whether federal or state common law applies, state attorney
geherals should not give courts any reason to infer federal question

jurisdiction exists from the four comers of a complaint.
The "relevant segment" language in the State's complaint also
prompted the Fourth Circuit to affirm navigability based on the entire
segment. 18 4 Importantly, segments are not navigable under the federal test
if any portage disrupts potential navigability. 8' 5 The State's concession that
portions of the segment had been portaged proved fatal to its case. 186 Taking
into account both the "relevant segment" language and concession of
portages, the district court found the entire segment unnavigable.' 87 The
Fourth Circuit also determined the segment stipulation and portages
concession was persuasive.' 8 8
As the federal judge said in his order granting Alcoa's motion for
summary judgment, "hindsight is often better than foresight."' 819 While the
State was perhaps attempting to limit the scope of the judicial inquiry under
North Carolina law,' 90 future state actors should be mindful of early
stipulations. Generally, avoiding the terminology "relevant segment" in a

184. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d 140, 150-51 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981
(2018). The court noted:
On the issue of segmentation, North Carolina's complaint described the entire
contested stretch of river as the "Relevant Segment".... North Carolina now
claims that it did not intend its use of the term "Relevant Segment" to serve as a
concession that the entire segment should be considered as a whole for purposes of
determining navigability....
While the district court assumed that there was no dispute about the
appropriate segment for consideration, it nonetheless had sufficient evidence before
it to support its treatment of the entire segment as a single entity.
Id.
185. PPL Mont., LLC, 565 U.S. at 597-98. Seemingly, a complaint omitting points of a
river that require portaging is more likely to be successful. See Ausness, supra note 117, at
217-18 (discussing the effect of portages on the river's navigability in PPL Montana).
186. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 145-46; North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc.,
No. 5:13-CV-633-BO, 2015 WL 2131089, at *5 (E.D.N.C. 2015) ("Most persuasive to the
[c]ourt, however, is the fact that the State conceded that the [n]arrows and [flalls were always
portaged.").
187. Id.at *4 ("Given that the stipulated segment includes the [flalls and [n]arrows, and
that the State conceded both portions had to be portaged, the [c]ourt is compelled to conclude
that the Relevant Segment, in its entirety, was not navigable in fact at statehood.").
188. Alcoa Power, 853 F.3d at 149.
189. North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Dep't of Admin. v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 3d 385, 396 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
190. See Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 681 S.E.2d. 819, 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
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complaint or answer could alleviate risk of early stipulations and perhaps
signal to the court that state navigability common law rules apply.
CONCLUSION

Since founding, North Carolina's public trust doctrine has protected the
North
state's navigable waterways and their underlying riverbeds.
Carolina's definition of navigability is deeply rooted in its common law, and
operates as a rule of construction-presuming that the legislature did not
intend to convey lands that would impair public trust rights. With many
statutes and a state constitutional amendment, North Carolina has long
valued protecting its public lands for future generations.
In North Carolinav. Alcoa Power Generating,Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit effectively overruled the North
The present
Carolina common law rules governing navigability.
concerns
policy
public
include
decision
Circuit's
consequences of the Fourth
and clouded land titles in North Carolina. The future ramifications include
an expansion of federal question jurisdiction and an upheaval of common
law navigability rules in the original thirteen states.
Submerged 'land litigation implicates unique choice of law
considerations. By disregarding common law precedent dating back to the
American Revolution, the Fourth Circuit's decision disrupts the delicate
balance of federalism between state and federal courts. Especially in the
original thirteen states, which received their public trust lands directly from
the British Crown. The presumptions and public policies behind the public
trust doctrine show states, as trustees, must work diligently to protect public
trust lands for future generations. After North Carolina v. Alcoa Power
Generating, Inc., attorney generals of the original thirteen states must
proceed with caution in protecting their public trust corpus.
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